The internal deliberations of the Bush presidentship are non know from prevalently available primary sources. However, the Bush Administration all the way had an interest in seeking a Congressional potentiality for armament action against Iraq, for several reasons. In terms of late(a) historical precedent, the 1991 Gulf War occlusion provided a representative of an action that was nearly equivalent to a declaration of war, and served fundamentally the same policy and political functions.
A Congressional dominance is useful primarily as a legitimizing instrument. It establishes a military action as a topic pur raise up kinda than simply an Administration initiative, some(prenominal) in the domestic and worldwide arenas. Each of these types of legitimacy were relevant concerns for Administration policymakers. Each whitethorn be dealt with independently, though in practice they dovetailed together.
A. Domestic Legitimacy. During the summer of 2002, as planning for war with Iraq was taking form, the Bush Administration was in a strong political position. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had produced a great swell of public approval for Presid
However, the same factors that made a Congressional resolution so important also meant that obtaining one might pose a substantial political challenge. This had not been the case in Afghanistan, where the very close connection between the Taliban regime and nucleotide had ensured overwhelming public and Congressional support. Moreover, simply obtaining "any" resolution was not regarded as satisfactory. The Administration wanted a more often than not worded resolution that imposed minimal constraints -- in particular, one that did not require returning to Congress for a final move for actual military action.
War commenced on March 20, 2003, and the "major combat" phase went extremely well.
The aftermath, however, has gone very considerably awry from the Administration's apparent expectations. The current situation in Iraq lies impertinent the scope of this discussion. However, the Administration's political problems in dealing with the Iraq have been importantly complicated by the measures it undertook to secure the authorizing resolution. The Administration has in way out had to take up and defend the arguments it initially made the foregoing year (Cheney, 2003).
The "inside" process might also be distinguished into policy and political components. The policy component consisted of do the case for the Administration policy as in the national interest. The political component consisted of making the case that individual Senators and Representatives would social welfare politically from supporting the Administration -- or be at political risk if they opposed the resolution.
Nevertheless, during the summer of 2002, support for a further action against Iraq was quite uneven. On the one hand, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War had firmly completed the place of Saddam Hussein in American public demonology. He had in the past used poison gas, both against Iranians and Iraqi Kurds, and had made efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. Since the late nineties
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